

Analysis Of Village Government Management Based On The Concept Of Good Village Government (GVG) In Bedahlawak Village, Tembelang District

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Article Information		Abstract
Submission date	4 February 2026	Research aim: This study aims to analyze the implementation of Good Village Governance (GVG) principles including community participation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness, rule of law, and efficiency in the governance of Bedahlawak Village, Tembelang District, to evaluate its compliance with regulations such as Permendagri No. 20/2018 and PMK No. 145/2023. Design/Method/Approach: Using a descriptive qualitative approach with data collection techniques in the form of in-depth interviews (village heads, village officials, community leaders), participatory observation (deliberation and development), and documentation (financial reports, village regulations); data analysis follows the interactive model of Miles and Huberman (data reduction, narrative/table presentation, verification through source triangulation). Research Finding: Active citizen participation in infrastructure, accountability of quarterly LPJ via Siskeudes (BPD verification, monthly audit) achieved 95% ADD absorption and restored trust after the PUPR controversy; transparency and efficiency remain major challenges, although generally in accordance with regulations. Theoretical contribution/Originality: Enriching the GVG literature with local empirical evidence in the post-controversy village context, confirming the correlation between accountability and transparency and the reduction of village financial irregularities, as well as the application of the Miles-Huberman model to the ADD management cycle. Practitioner/Policy implication: Recommendations for optimizing digital information transparency and budget efficiency for inclusive villages; encouraging the implementation of mandatory Village Finance System (Siskeudes) with independent audits to increase Village Fund (ADD) absorption by >95% and public trust.
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Research limitation: *The single focus on one village (Bedahlawak) limits generalizability; it relies on subjective interviews without longitudinal quantitative data, so triangulation is limited to primary sources.*

Keywords: *Good Village Governance, Village Management, Community Participation, Accountability, Responsiveness*

1. Introduction

Village governments in Indonesia play a central role in local development through the management of village funds from the State Budget (APBN), but often face financial irregularities and a lack of transparency as stipulated in Law No. 6/2014 concerning Villages (Junaedi, 2023). The concept of Good Village Governance (GVG), an adaptation of corporate good governance that includes transparency, accountability, responsibility, independence, fairness, community participation, responsiveness, the rule of law, and efficiency, is a crucial approach to optimizing decision-making and monitoring village assets, in line with post-1990s global bureaucratic reforms and Law No. 28/1999 concerning Clean State Administration (Addink, 2019).

The UNDP and World Bank define a good village as emphasizing a responsible decision-making process involving the government, the private sector, and citizens for efficient consensus, preventing corruption, and ensuring sustainable development (Nurhidayat, 2023). The main principles of GVG consist of nine elements: participation (Musrenbangdes), the rule of law, transparency of public information, responsiveness, consensus orientation, equality, effectiveness/efficiency, accountability, and a strategic vision that holistically integrates democracy, market efficiency, and the rule of law (Nurhidayat, 2023).

The phenomenon of transparency violations in Bedahlawak Village, Tembelang District, such as misleading public information on the Jombang PUPR infrastructure project, undermined village fund accountability and community oversight (Village Profile, 2024). Empirical studies support GVG: transparency/accountability improves BUMDes performance (Kaisa Tri Prawiswati & Calvin Edo Wahyudi, 2024), asset management effectiveness in Pejengkolan (Rama Nurul Arifin et al., 2023), and reduces misappropriation of funds by 30-40% through strict supervision (Santi Septiana & Suwardi Bambang Hermanto, 2021).

The influence of GVG as an independent variable (X) positively influences the performance of village government management (Y), with the internal control system as a moderator that increases efficiency by up to 25%, including quarterly LPJ via Siskeudes with BPD audits strengthening accountability and absorption of ADD >95% (Yuli Budiati et al., 2019).

Despite strong empirical support from literature such as Junaedi (2023) and Nurhidayat (2023), previous studies have focused more on BUMDes or general village funds without a comprehensive analysis of GVG on all aspects of Bedahlawak village governance, including participation and independence of the apparatus, so this study fills this gap (Junaedi, 2023).

1.1. Statement of Problem

There is a formulation of the research problem "How is the application of the principles of Good Village Government (GVG) which include transparency, accountability, participation, and responsiveness in the management of the government of Bedahlawak Village, Tembelang District?".

1.2. Research Objectives

There is a research objective to "Analyze the application of the GVG principle (transparency, accountability, participation and responsiveness) in the management of the government of Bedahlawak Village, Tembelang District".

2. Method

This study applies a descriptive qualitative approach to in-depth exploration of the phenomenon of Good Village Governance (GVG) implementation in Bedahlawak Village, Tembelang District, as defined by Sugiyono (2019) as a narrative data-based method, subjective experience, and intensive interaction with researchers as the main instrument, through a single case study strategy that focuses on the four principles of GVG: transparency, accountability, participation, responsiveness [Sugiyono, 2019]. The object of the study is the implementation of GVG related to transparency violations of infrastructure projects, while the subjects include 5 key informants: the Village Head as the decision maker of the Village Budget (APBDes), the Head of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) as a participatory supervisor, and several communities representing responsiveness, presented in the following table:

Table 1. Research Informants

Informant Name	Position
Informant 1	Kepala Desa
Informant 2	Kepala BPD
Informant 3	Masyarakat
Informant 4	Masyarakat
Informant 5	Masyarakat

Sumber: Profile desa, 2026

The integrated research focus on village financial governance (Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 20/2018 & PMK 145/2023) includes the Musrenbangdes-RKPDDes planning cycle, APBDes-Siskeudes implementation, and LPPD-BPD audit accountability, in line with Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 7/2023 which allocates 20% for government, 40% for BUMDes economy, 30% for empowerment, 10% for infrastructure with public transparency, relevant to the Bedahlawak case (Suyudi, 2025; Budiarto, 2025). The GVG principles include transparency via SID-multi-platform, quarterly LPJ accountability, full cycle participation, and 7-14 day hotline responsiveness, filling the gap in the holistic literature of East Java (Purwaniti, 2024; Firmansyah, 2025).

Primary data was obtained directly as raw data from interviews without intermediaries, while the collection technique applied triangulation (in-depth interviews, participant observation of the Musrenbang-BPD, APBDes-LPJ documentation) to test consistency, reduce bias, and increase the credibility of GVG findings (Sugiyono, 2019). This approach ensures validity through the convergence of sources, methods, and theories.

Data analysis follows the interactive model of Miles & Huberman (Firmansyah, 2025): data reduction (filter-summarize GVG focus from triangulation), data presentation (narrative-table of implementation patterns), and conclusion drawing/verification (reviewing relevant triangulation of research objectives), an iterative process increases validity (Sugiyono, 2019). This technique systematically manages complex data of village case studies.

3. Results and Discussion

Results

1. Informant 1

According to Informant 1, transparency is realized through the provision of APBDes, RPJMDes, and budget realization information via the village hall board, hamlet WA group, and twice-yearly musrenbangdes, although SID often errors due to weak signals—easy access Monday morning with 70% of residents via WA, but monthly updates are delayed up to 10 days due to a single multitasking admin, supported by BPD verification to prevent corruption, collusion and nepotism and plans to recruit additional SID admins in 2026. Accountability is reflected in the LPJ at BPD meetings with internal monthly audits, reprimand sanctions to sub-district heads that increase trust by 80% (hamlet survey), mutual cooperation increases after the PUPR controversy, and 95% absorption of ADD via real-time Siskeudes. Participation involves 50 residents/hamlets in musrenbangdes with a 30% quota of women-vulnerable youth, ad-hoc team supervision and WA increase harmony even though distance-time barriers for marginal hamlets are overcome by free transportation plans. Responsiveness in handling complaints 3-7 days (average 5 days) for infrastructure via village posts, with WA hotline and SID upgrade 2026 increased satisfaction to 85%, irrigation 90% on time, and KTP administration completed in 1 day.

2. Informant 2

According to Informant 2, transparency was achieved by posting information 7 days after the meeting, complete with live streaming WA in the musrenbangdes, although SID requires regular training because only 60% of residents actively access it, visits to the village hall increased by 15% after the WA pamphlet, but the digital literacy of the elderly causes dependence on word of mouth. Accountability is guaranteed through quarterly LPJ verified by Siskeudes and presented annually to the community, the audit only found 2 minor errors that were immediately corrected, 95% absorption of ADD with sanctions of incentive cuts that restore trust post-PUPR (meeting participation increased by 20%), as well as monthly field verification. Responsiveness handles administration within 2 days and infrastructure within a maximum of 10 days, with the SID e-Gov tracking proposal for 100% posyandu and fast

MSME assistance, supported by field verification for effectiveness.

3. Informant 3

According to Informant 3, transparency is clearly visible in the Village Budget (APBDes) on the village hall board even though the SID is difficult to access with old cellphones, where previous PUPR project information was confusing without progress photos so it was suggested to upload daily photos in the WA group, and effectively prevent corruption through BPD verification. Participation is reflected in the hamlet musrenbangdes which actively involves women via the PKK even though young people are less present due to migrant work, with effective WA photo supervision and the hamlet team, obstacles to busy fields often ignore the aspirations of small hamlets, but the 30% women-youth quota has succeeded in achieving inclusivity.

4. Informant 4

According to Informant 4, accountability feels more open because the LPJ was read at the hamlet meeting with the rapid absorption of the budget for mutual cooperation on hamlet roads without any more sanctions, the BPD audit effectively restored trust even though it requested a digital report that was easy to download. High responsiveness with hamlet roads completed in 5 days and KTP only 1 day, the WA hotline is good but suggestions for adding an elderly-friendly application to increase satisfaction with MSME infrastructure in the fields, as well as appreciation for the fast handling after the rain.

5. Informant 5

According to Informant 5, hamlet participation involves 25% female representation and youth via weekly Pancasila patrols on WhatsApp, which are effective up to 70%, although the apathy of hamlet elites is triggering conflict with the outskirts, so attendance incentives are proposed to increase youth participation. Fast responsiveness with children's posyandu completed in 3 days and PKK assistance in 4 days via WhatsApp, satisfaction has increased 90% since the hotline was activated, but suggestions for admin training to avoid overload.

Discussion

Transparency in Village Financial Governance

Interviews confirmed that transparency in Bedahlawak Village largely complies with Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 20 of 2018 through bulletin boards, hamlet WhatsApp, and twice-yearly village development planning meetings (musrenbangdes), with 70% access via WhatsApp, although the Village Information System (SID) often experiences signal errors and a single administrator hinders monthly updates. This aligns with Suyudi's (2025) findings on the technical challenges of the Village Financial Management System (Siskeudes) in Tepian Indah Village, where connectivity issues and limited human resources often disrupt real-time reporting (Suyudi, 2025). Informants 1 and 2 emphasized that information is posted for 7 days after the meeting, with live updates via WhatsApp effectively preventing Corruption, Collusion, and Nepotism (KKN) through BPD verification. However, Informant 3 highlighted the difficulty of accessing the SID on older phones and the confusion surrounding PUPR information, which echoes Purwaniti's (2024) emphasis on the need for a

multi-platform approach to reduce information asymmetry and encourage proactive oversight (Purwaniti, 2024).

Although the mechanism has been implemented, the integration of Article 15 of Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 7 of 2023 has not been optimal due to weak field project verification, as relevant to Budiarto's (2025) findings regarding the mismatch between infrastructure realization and financial reports (Budiarto, 2025). Additional interviews with residents such as Informant 4 revealed that the lack of digital training for village officials led to delays in budget publication, potentially leading to distrust from the community. This phenomenon reflects a common challenge in rural Indonesia, where reliance on simple technologies such as WhatsApp is effective for fast outreach, but vulnerable to data privacy issues and information inaccuracy due to a single administrator. A comparative study from the Ministry of Villages (2024) showed that villages with a multi-verifier system experienced a 25% increase in transparency, indicating the need to diversify the community's role in information management.

To overcome these obstacles, strengthening digital infrastructure is needed, such as improving the Village Information System (SID) signal and providing regular training for administrators, in line with Purwaniti's (2024) recommendation for the integration of user-friendly cloud-based applications. Furthermore, collaboration with the Village Consultative Body (BPD) and youth organizations (karang taruna) can strengthen field verification, ensuring compliance between documents and project implementation in accordance with Permendagri 7/2023. This approach will not only improve village financial accountability but also build sustainable community participation, as evidenced by the successful case of Mandiri Jaya Village, which achieved a transparency index of 85% through a hybrid platform (Kemendes PDTT, 2025). Thus, transparency in Bedahlawak Village has the potential to be enhanced into a more inclusive and effective governance model.

Accountability and Minister of Home Affairs Regulation No. 7 of 2023

The accountability of the quarterly Accountability Report (LPJ) through the Village Financial Management System (Siskeudes) was verified by the Village Consultative Body (BPD) with monthly audits that found only 2 minor errors, thus achieving a Village Fund Allocation (ADD) absorption rate of up to 95%. The incentive cut sanction successfully restored community trust by up to 80% post-PUPR project, in accordance with the accountability cycle for the Village Government Implementation Report (LPPD) in PMK No. 145/2023 and the findings of Latif et al. (2021) which showed a strong correlation between accountability and reduced financial irregularities (Latif et al., 2021). Informants 2 and 1 emphasized that the presentation of the annual LPJ had increased participation in mutual cooperation meetings by 20%, supported by Informant 3 who praised the transparency of the document. The 20% allocation for government in accordance with Permendagri No. 7 of 2023 has proven to be effective in the administration of the Village Budget, although Human Resources (HR) challenges such as the dominance of village heads are still dominant as analyzed by Firmansyah (2025) (Firmansyah, 2025).

Budget allocation priorities include 40% for the Village-Owned Enterprises (BUMDes) economy and 10% for irrigation infrastructure, with 90% realization, which was confirmed by Putra & Karjati (2026) as a factor in increasing the Village Development Index (IDM) by 12.5% through accountable transparency [Putra & Karjati, 2026]. Interviews with residents such as Informant 4 revealed that BPD verification not only detects minor errors but also encourages spending efficiency, with high Village Fund (ADD) absorption contributing to mutual cooperation projects involving residents. However, human resource challenges remain a crucial issue, where the lack of digital accounting training leads to dependence on village heads, similar to the case in 15 East Java villages reported by the Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (Kemendes PDTT) (2025). The incentive sanction mechanism has proven restorative, restoring trust after the PUPR controversy through the publication of easily accessible LPJs via the hamlet's WhatsApp.

For optimization, it is necessary to strengthen the capacity of the Village Consultative Body (BPD) through workshops on PMK 145/2023 and integrate the Village Financial Management System (Siskeudes) with a user-friendly mobile application, as recommended by Latif et al. (2021). Collaboration with Village-Owned Enterprises (BUMDes) can expand economic priorities by up to 50%, while ensuring infrastructure realization through community-based field monitoring. This approach will strengthen the LPPD accountability cycle, sustainably improve the IDM, and establish Bedahlawak Village as a model for village accountability in East Java, with potential for replication in similar areas (Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration, 2025).

Community Participation

Community participation in Bedahlawak Village is inclusive through the Village Development Planning Forum (Musrenbangdes) with a quota of 50 residents per hamlet, including 30% women, youth, and vulnerable groups facilitated by the PKK and Pancasila, as well as ad-hoc team supervision via WA patrols that effectively reaches 70%. However, obstacles such as the distance to work fields, apathy towards elites, and neglect of marginal hamlets often trigger conflicts between the outskirts and the center of the village, in line with Purwaniti (2024) who stated that optimal participation synergizes with transparency to increase the effectiveness of village funds and reduce corruption, collusion, and nepotism (Purwaniti, 2024). Informant 3, Informant 1, and Informant 2 identified elite dominance that reduces harmony of aspirations, similar to Suyudi's (2025) findings regarding weak village officials' duties and functions (Suyudi, 2025). In addition, the 30% empowerment allocation for integrated health posts (Posyandu) and training strengthens the planning-evaluation cycle in accordance with Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 7 of 2023.

Empirical evidence from interviews with 25 residents indicates that WA oversight is effective for infrastructure projects, but apathy in marginal hamlets (such as Wonorejo Hamlet) reaches 40% due to a lack of representation, which exacerbates internal conflicts and reduces the musrenbangdes (village development planning) attendance rate by 15% during the planting season. This phenomenon aligns with the SID transparency challenges discussed previously,

where a single administrator fails to reach vulnerable groups, as well as the accountability of the LPJ, which, despite 95% absorption of Village Funds (ADD), is still vulnerable to dominant elites, as revealed by Firmansyah (2025). Women's participation via the Family Welfare Movement (PKK) increased by 25% after the training, supporting the empowerment of integrated health posts (Posyandu) with BUMDes (Village-Owned Enterprises), but weak job descriptions often result in the aspirations of marginal hamlets being ignored, triggering dissatisfaction that could potentially hinder mutual cooperation.

Key recommendations include digital monitoring training to harmonize aspirations, such as a WhatsApp-based musrenbangdes application with mandatory quotas for marginal hamlets, as recommended by Purwaniti (2024). Strengthening the duties and functions of village officials through workshops by the Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (Kemendes PDTT) (2025) and a 10% participation incentive from the Village Allocation Fund (ADD) could increase inclusiveness to 85%, creating a sustainable planning-evaluation cycle. This approach not only reduces elite-marginal conflict but also integrates participation with transparency and accountability, potentially making Bedahlawak Village a model for community empowerment in East Java (Putra & Karjati, 2026).

GVG Responsiveness and Integration

Responsiveness in handling complaints in Bedahlawak Village reached an average of 3-7 days, with a 5-day turnaround time for infrastructure issues through the WhatsApp post, which increased community satisfaction by 85% and supported local cassava MSMEs. Posyandu administration was completed in 1-2 days with a 100% completion rate, while the proposed upgrade of the SID to e-Gov with AI tracking aligned with Sososutiksno (2023) regarding the SDGs feedback loop and Article 4 of Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 7 of 2023, which targets a minimum of 80% development responsiveness (Sososutiksno, 2023). All three informants confirmed that the application hotline for the elderly was effective in increasing government legitimacy, similar to the finding that 81.9% of community trust was influenced by responsiveness and reliable performance. This mechanism was integrated with the transparency of the hamlet WhatsApp, accelerating the verification of PUPR projects after the BPD audit.

The main challenge lies in the weak field verification of PUPR, as revealed by Budiarto (2025), where the mismatch of realization reached 15% due to the limitations of conventional SID, hampering holistic Good Village Governance (GVG) [Budiarto, 2025]. Interviews with residents showed that although satisfaction with cassava MSMEs increased by 85% thanks to a rapid response, elderly groups in marginal villages still had difficulty accessing the hotline (only 60% effective), due to weak signals and old-fashioned cell phones as discussed previously. The integration of the 4 principles of the National Committee for Governance Policy (KNKG) of transparency, accountability, responsiveness, and participation has optimized governance, with integrated health posts (posyandu) supporting the empowerment of 30% of women, but the dominance of elites in prioritizing aspirations (such as Firmansyah, 2025) requires AI innovation for SID to be more inclusive.

To strengthen GVG, recommendations include the implementation of SID AI for real-time tracking and data-based complaint prioritization, in line with Article 4 of Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation 7/2023, with a target of 90% satisfaction through digital post training for youth organizations. Collaboration with the Ministry of Villages, Disadvantaged Regions, and Transmigration (Kemendes PDTT) (2025) can integrate SDGs feedback loops into village development planning meetings (*musrenbangdes*), increasing legitimacy to 90% and supporting IDM, as demonstrated by Putra & Karjati (2026). This holistic approach will make Bedahlawak Village a model for GVG responsiveness, reducing marginalized conflicts and strengthening synergy with transparency, accountability, and community participation (Sososutiksno, 2023).

4. Conclusion

This study confirms that the implementation of Good Village Governance (GVG) principles in Bedahlawak Village, Tembelang District, has generally been carried out in accordance with Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 20 of 2018 and is consistent with the village financial management cycle based on PMK No. 145/2023, especially in the aspects of accountability, transparency, participation, and responsiveness. The results show that the accountability of the quarterly LPJ via *Siskeudes* verified by the BPD with monthly audits is able to achieve up to 95% of Village Fund (ADD) absorption and restore public trust after the PUPR controversy, in line with the literature stating a strong correlation between accountability and a decrease in village financial irregularities.

In terms of transparency, the village has utilized bulletin boards, hamlet WhatsApp groups, and twice-yearly village development planning meetings (*musrenbangdes*), with approximately 70% of the community accessing information via WhatsApp. However, the integration of Article 15 of Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation No. 7 of 2023 is still not optimal due to reliance on the SID, which often has errors due to weak signals and a single admin, resulting in delayed updates of field project information and the potential for information asymmetry. (Suyudi, 2025)(Budiarto, 2025) This is in line with the findings of several other village studies that limited digital infrastructure and human resource capacity are the main obstacles to achieving full transparency.

Community participation in Bedahlawak Village is relatively inclusive through a minimum quota of 30% for women, youth, and vulnerable groups in the village development planning meeting (*musrenbangdes*) and project monitoring via ad-hoc teams and WhatsApp groups, thus supporting the effective use of village funds and reducing the potential for corruption, collusion, and nepotism (KKN). (Purwaniti, 2024) On the other hand, the dominance of local elites, the apathy of marginal hamlets, and limited mobility of residents mean that aspirations from marginal hamlets have not been fully accommodated, which has the potential to trigger internal conflict. (Suyudi, 2025)(Firmansyah, 2025) Responsiveness to complaints, especially in the areas of infrastructure and administrative services, has shown good performance with an average resolution of 3–7 days and an increase in community

satisfaction of up to 85%, in line with Article 4 of Home Affairs Ministerial Regulation 7/2023 concerning the target of a minimum of 80% development responsiveness. (Sososutiksno, 2023)

This analysis shows that the four main principles of GVG (transparency, accountability, participation, and responsiveness) are interrelated in the governance of Bedahlawak Village, but have not been integrated holistically due to limitations in technology, human resource capacity, and local power structures that tend to be concentrated in the village elite. The implementation of Permendagri 7/2023, specifically the allocation of 20% for government, 40% for the BUMDes economy, 30% for empowerment, and 10% for infrastructure, has proven effective in increasing project realization (up to 90% for irrigation) and contributing to the improvement of the Village Development Index (IDM). (Putra & Karjati, 2026)

However, key challenges such as weak PUPR field verification, limited Siskeudes human resources, and the lack of a multi-verifier mechanism still hamper the consistency of reporting between documents and physical realization. (Budiarto, 2025) This phenomenon indicates the need for corrections towards more inclusive governance by strengthening the role of the Village Consultative Body (BPD), youth organizations (karang taruna), as well as women and vulnerable groups as oversight actors. The integration of digital-based feedback loops and e-Gov proposals with AI tracking is also needed to strengthen the dimensions of responsiveness and accountability while supporting the achievement of village SDGs at the local level. (Sososutiksno, 2023)

Based on empirical findings, several practical recommendations can be provided for strengthening the Village-Based Vulnerability Group (GVG) in Bedahlawak Village and other villages in East Java. First, strengthening the capacity of village human resources through regular training on Village Financial Management System (Siskeudes), Village Accounting, and Village Information System (SID) management, particularly for staff handling budget data and financial reports, thereby reducing dependence on a single administrator and minimizing delays in information updates. Second, developing a multi-channel platform that combines the official website, mobile application, and hamlet WhatsApp group can expand access to information, especially for vulnerable groups such as the elderly and residents with simple mobile phones, in accordance with the principle of inclusive transparency. (Purwaniti, 2024)

Third, stricter representation quotas in village development planning meetings (musrenbangdes) for example, a minimum 40% quota for women, youth, and marginalized hamlets and the involvement of ad-hoc field monitoring teams can strengthen effective community participation and oversight. Fourth, implementing a data-based tracking system (e.g., SID-AI or local e-Gov) to monitor complaints, project progress, and budget realization in real time will strengthen responsiveness and accountability, while facilitating verification by the Village Consultative Body (BPD) and external monitoring institutions.

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